



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29 September 1960



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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DATE: 2010  
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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 September 1960

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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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North Vietnam - USSR - Communist China: Ho Chi Minh intends to keep North Vietnam out of the Sino-Soviet dispute,

Ho de-  
plored the effect the dispute was having on the Communist movement outside the bloc. He said that after the Bucharest conference he had tried to get Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung to "sit together and resolve their differences" but both had refused. Although Ho indicated personal preference for certain Chinese views, his noncommittal policy is borne out by recent North Vietnamese speeches.

OK

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Afghanistan-Pakistan: The danger of clashes between Afghan and Pakistani regular forces is mounting as tribal fighting along the frontier continues and Afghan forces become more deeply involved. The Pakistani Air Force is organizing an air drop for use in the event it is decided to send regular army troops into the area. Meanwhile, there are reports of disturbances in some Afghan cities, possibly a result of opposition to the call-up of reserves.

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29 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

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LATE ITEM

\*Laos: The capture on 28 September of Sam Neua town, with its key airfield, will give the Communist Pathet Lao important bargaining leverage in any peace talks with the royal Laotian government. The status of the Sam Neua garrison is not clear, but it had earlier been reported planning to establish new defense positions at Muong Peun, about 20 miles southwest of Sam Neua town. Support of this position would be extremely difficult because of its relative inaccessibility by surface means and because its small airstrip is only marginally serviceable. Vientiane radio claims, meanwhile, that there has been a revolt in the Second Military Region command structure and that the region, which has jurisdiction over Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang Provinces, has now swung its support to the Souvanna Phouma government. If this is true, Lao army forces in Sam Neua may negotiate a truce with the Pathet Lao rather than make a stand at Muong Peun. OK

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DAILY BRIEF

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Military commanders representing the Souvanna regime and General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee agreed in Luang Prabang on 28 September to a cease-fire between their respective forces pending the outcome of negotiations on substantive points at issue between the two groups. These talks are slated to begin within five days. 25X1

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DAILY BRIEF

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North Vietnam Hopes to Stay Out of Sino-Soviet Feud

[Ho Chi Minh intends to keep North Vietnam out of the Sino-Soviet dispute, [REDACTED]]

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Ho expressed deep concern about the feud, deploring its effect on Communist movements outside the bloc.]

[The North Vietnamese leader, who made an unannounced trip to Moscow in mid-August and has consistently stressed the need for "socialist unity" in recent speeches, admitted his own efforts at mediation had failed. He said that after the Bucharest conference in June, he had tried to get Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung to "sit together and resolve their differences" but each, convinced that his position alone was the correct one, had refused. Ho complained "neither Khrushchev nor Mao seemed to realize" the damage their dispute was doing.]

[An old-line revolutionary determined to overthrow the present government of South Vietnam, Ho expressed some personal views which would be more acceptable in Peiping than in Moscow. In Ho's opinion, the "bourgeois" elements who brought Afro-Asian nations from colonial status to independence had served their purpose and should now be disposed of by "class struggle." [REDACTED]]

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[Whatever his private sentiments, Ho's noncommittal policy was borne out by his speeches at the North Vietnamese congress. North Vietnamese writers and spokesmen have continued since then to avoid those aspects of the ideological debate which could be construed as criticism of either Khrushchev or Mao Tse-tung.] [REDACTED]

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Danger of Afghan-Pakistani Strife Increasing

The danger of clashes between Afghan and Pakistani army units is mounting as tribal fighting along the frontier continues, with heavy casualties, and Afghan forces become more deeply involved.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir announced on 28 September that "the government of Pakistan is holding itself in readiness for all eventualities and is capable of dealing effectively with all attempts at violating Pakistan's frontiers." He emphasized Afghanistan's "hostile concentrations" along the border, and stated that the Afghans reportedly are claiming that they have the support of a "certain big power." [As an indication of the extent of its concern, the foreign secretary on 28 September called in the Soviet and American ambassadors to present his government's views on the situation. In commenting on rumors of Soviet promises of military support to Afghanistan, he told the Soviet ambassador, "We expect and hope the USSR will not get involved."] ]

The Pakistani Air Force is organizing an air drop in the event it is decided to send regular army troops into the mountains where the fighting is taking place. The Pakistanis apparently hope, however, that tribes friendly to Pakistan will gain control, expel the Afghan irregulars who have crossed the border, and restore order.

The Afghans have shown considerable concern about Pakistan's reaction to the border provocations. [Kabul has apparently placed its Soviet-supplied MIG-17 jet fighters on the alert.] Afghanistan's continued efforts to strengthen its military position along the border are probably directed at preventing Pakistan from stirring up trouble among Afghanistan's tribes as well as at encouraging tribal opposition to Pakistani authority across the border.

Meanwhile, there are reports of disturbances in some Afghan cities, possibly a result of opposition to the call-up of reserves. Many reservists are reportedly already deserting.

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### The Situation in Laos

Sam Neua town, with its key airfield, has apparently fallen to the Pathet Lao forces which have been gradually advancing on it since about 1 September. The fate of the Sam Neua garrison is not clear, but it had been earlier reported planning to establish new defense positions at Muong Peun, about 25 miles southwest of Sam Neua town. While Muong Peun is described as a good defensive position, support of troops there would probably present serious problems. It would be difficult to supply and reenforce the garrison by surface means, and Muong Peun's small airstrip is only marginally serviceable. Control of Sam Neua town, the military and administrative center of Sam Neua Province, will give the Pathet Lao important bargaining leverage in any peace talks with the royal government.

Vientiane radio has broadcast a statement by Lt. Col. Kham Hou, military commander in Xieng Khouang Province, claiming that he had assumed command of the Second Military Region and pledging his loyalty to the Souvanna Phouma government. The region, which embraces Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang Provinces, has been loyal to General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. It is as yet unclear whether Kham Hou can legitimately speak for the whole region, but if the region has in fact swung to Souvanna, it constitutes a serious blow to Phoumi's fortunes. Any such switch might also lead the Lao army forces in Sam Neua to negotiate a truce rather than offer further resistance to the Pathet Lao.

[Military commanders representing the Souvanna regime and the Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee, led by Generals Ouane and Phoumi respectively, held a short meeting in Luang Prabang on 28 September which resulted in a cease-fire agreement between their forces. This meeting is to be followed within five days by a full dress conference of military and political leaders from both sides who will seek to resolve the substantive points at issue. A mutually face-saving compromise will be difficult to achieve.]

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[Souvanna Phouma, in confirming to Ambassador Brown that his government had approached the Soviet ambassador in Phnom Penh with the suggestion that diplomatic relations with non-resident envoys be established, pleaded the pressure of "public opinion" as the reason for his move. He added that relations would not actually be established for at least a month. Should a new government emerge from the impending political conference, it is possible that the effort to establish relations with the USSR will be quietly dropped.]<sup>7</sup>

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